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This paper studies effectiveness of school choice and type of school districts’ political 
institutions jointly vis-à-vis student learning. School choice relies on market-oriented 
policies for reforming public education, but their effectiveness, i.e., equity and productive 
efficiency is debatable. The effectiveness of different types of political institutions that 
manage school districts and compete for students in urban regions in the USA is also a 
neglected area of research. This study fills these gaps by empirically investigating the joint 
relationships of inter-school district competition- a key dimension of school choice- and 
local political institutions with student learning. Results from the analysis of a unique data 
show that inter-school district competition has some productive efficiency effects on 
student achievement, the political institution does not. The inter-school district competition 
and political institutions have differential equity effects on student achievement. This paper 
substantively discusses these results in the context of school choice and marginalization.  
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For several decades now, governments have laid their hands on market competition-oriented 
policies in one or more forms of school choice to reform public education. Numerous studies have 
investigated these policies and have subsequently generated considerable amount of controversy 
both theoretically and empirically. However, studies have completely ignored the important role 
that local political institutions play as street-level implementers of school choice policies in the 
USA. A study of the effectiveness of these two factors together is warranted as such a study can 
shed policy relevant insights on policymakers’ efforts in reforming public education in the USA. 
This study therefore investigates the effectiveness of school choice and local political institutions 
jointly by operationalizing school choice as inter-school district competition in the urban regional 
market and operationalizing local political institutions as different types of governing bodies that 
exist across school districts in the USA. Furthermore, consistent with the practice in the literature 
this study examines this joint effectiveness by evaluating productive efficiency and equity in 
relationships of these two factors with student learning. This study also undertakes empirical 
comparison between school choice theory that entails existence of polycentric governments in a 
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region and its contradictory theory of consolidated regional government. A unique dataset allows 
empirical investigation of these policy relevant questions appropriately.     
Proponents of school choice policies rely on the argument that multiple providers including 
private schools on the supply side bring productive efficiency gains and parents also have 
significant choices for their kids on the demand side.  In the USA the several players that afford 
school choice in public education market include charter schools, magnet schools, vouchers, 
federal, state, and local governments and parents (Verger et al., 2016). Each of these school choices 
has been extensively studied since Chubb and Moe (1990) popularized Friedman’s (1955) original 
idea. One of the less studied topics within this free-market and school choice literature in the USA 
is inter-school district competition in the context of urban regional markets. Arguably local school 
districts’ governments compete for students in the regional market context from the supply side as 
they exercise significant autonomy in terms of resource mobilization and allocation. On the 
demand side, parents exercise their choice to reside in school districts that appropriately match 
with their preferences for property tax and the quality of public education. Different types of 
political institutions that govern these local school districts assume a central role in this setup. The 
idea behind maintaining such a polycentric form of local control is to bring productive efficiency 
and equity – the two elements of effectiveness - in the public education sector. Proponents argue 
that these outcomes manifest in terms of appropriate relationships between measures of 
competition and desirable indicators of student learning and achievement gaps along racial and 
family income lines.  
On the other hand, extant research that holds an opposing view confirms that racial and 
economic integration in the regional context have the potential to wipe out persistent achievement 
gaps and pull up overall student learning. Opponents of market-based school choice argue that 
school choice policies do not fulfill the market principles of freedom of choice and efficiency as 
competition benefits just the “best” students. Opponents further argue that it is detrimental to 
equity, social cohesion, and organizational sustainability. Concomitantly, the less educated and 
lower SES parents face difficulty in exercising choice due to lack of timely information, networks, 
and transportation. Students with greater needs find themselves in segregated school environments 
in terms of ethnicity and SES. These arguments together constitute the theory of consolidated 
regional government.  
Although several of the OECD countries have implemented school choice policies for 
some time now, conclusive empirical evidence on their effectiveness in student learning and 
reduction in achievement gaps are yet to emerge in this literature (Verger et al., 2016). The 
theoretical and empirical literatures on school choice policies such as charters and vouchers in 
general are rife with conflicting arguments and evidence. This paper takes a novel approach and 
examines the effectiveness of inter-school district competition and types of local political 
institutions in student achievement in the broader context of school choice and marginalization. 
The few studies on inter-school district competition offer inconclusive empirical evidence (Hoxby, 
2000; Rothstein, 2007). Existing research has ignored the role of local political institutions that are 
key players in the implementation of inter-school district competition in the regional context. The 
key set of research questions that I investigate include a) whether school choice or consolidated 
regional government is effective in public education; and b) why and how governing institutions 
of school districts perform key roles in managing competition for students in urban region markets. 
I study effectiveness by evaluating its two key components: productive efficiency and equity. To 
empirically study competition in the local urban government context, I utilize Craw’s (2008) 
Tamed Leviathan Model and the theory of consolidated regional government. The Tamed 
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Leviathan Model has integrated public choice and local political reform theories and I adapt and 
empirically examine this extended theory in the context of urban school districts in the USA. This 
paper’s empirical investigation offers theoretical insights and inform the policy debate on the roles 
of school choice and political institutions in bringing equity and efficiency in public education. 
This study fills gaps in the literature also by modeling the equity effects of school choice and 
political institutions on student achievement. Following Harris et. al. (2001), I utilize joint effects 
approach of the two factors along with school districts’ median household income category in my 
regression models. The empirical strategy underlying Hausman-Taylor panel data models and 
Multilevel Linear Regression models are utilized on a uniquely compiled longitudinal dataset from 
several sources, including Popularly Elected Officials Survey from the US Census Bureau, Local 
Education Agency (School District) Longitudinal Finance Survey, National Education 
Longitudinal Study, 1988-92 and School District Demographics System from the National Center 
for Education Statistics. As will be explained in the data and methodology section, data availability 
constraints concerning Popularly Elected Officials Survey force this study’s empirical analysis to 
confine within student learning outcomes in years 1990 and 1992. However, longitudinal analysis 
along with sophisticated modeling strategy allow for the findings of this study to remain valid in 
the current context. Finally, by highlighting the need to consider the joint effect of school choice 
and local political institutions in examining the success or failure of school choice policies, this 
study makes the case that the Popularly Elected Officials Survey is critical in evaluating school 
choice debate and therefore, it needs to continue in future.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Effectiveness, School Choice, and Public Education in the USA 
 
In the United States, local school districts provide K-12 public education and enroll approximately 
8/9 of students in the US (Levin, 2015). In the last fifty years spending on public schools has 
tripled in real terms (Peterson, 2010, p. 131) and it has grown five folds in real dollars over the last 
century (Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). Educational outcomes along racial and socioeconomic 
status have also not kept pace with rising funding levels and with various school reforms. 
Evaluating effectiveness in student learning is of paramount importance to policymakers because 
K-12 public education consumes about 34% of total state revenues in the US (US Census of 
Governments, 2007). Furthermore, policymakers also grapple with the issue that although the US 
is one of the highest spenders on public education both in terms of real per pupil dollars and as a 
proportion of GDP, the relative international ranking of the US in student learning falls below the 
median (Hanushek and Lindseth, 2009). These policy problems appear to be resistant to school 
choice, standards and accountability-based reforms developed over the last three decades. The 
overall trend in outcomes suggest that the K-12 public education in the US is comparatively less 
effective than several countries of the world. In contextualizing these problems and proposing 
policy-relevant solutions, researchers have studied several dimensions of effectiveness in public 
education. The two major approaches that scholars have taken to study effectiveness in educational 
outcomes are productive efficiency and equity (Odden and Picus, 2013). Most notably, scholars of 
school choice-based reforms in public education have studied these two dimensions extensively. 
On the efficiency side, school choice policies promised policymakers the expectation that 
market-like competition for students would nudge public schools toward efficiency in resource use 
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and better educational outcomes (Belfield and Levin, 2005; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Gill and 
Booker, 2015; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). Critics of school choice however find such policies 
both inefficient and inequitable. Critics argue that less educated and lower SES parents face 
difficulty in exercising choice due to a lack of timely information, networks, and transportation 
(Levin, 2015). Opponents of school choice further argue that competition will benefit White, 
higher SES students because choice is associated with segregated school environments (Epple and 
Romano, 2000; Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Levin, 2015; Orfield and Yun, 1999; Schneider et al., 1997; 
Wells, 1993). Opponents also argue that private schools would undermine the social purpose of 
schooling in their pursuit of making profits in the market (Gill and Booker, 2015; Levin, 2015; 
Wolfe, 2003). The effect of school choice on other public purposes of education, such as student 
integration and civic socialization are negative (Gill and Booker, 2015; Mickelson et al., 2011). 
These opponents would like to see an integrated metropolitan wide local government to realize 
efficiency because of economies of scale and equity because of mere integration. These arguments 
together constitute theory on consolidated local government. 
Indeed, institutional and organizational consolidation of local school districts in most of 
the 19th and 20th centuries have preceded the current school reforms based on decentralization that 
is inherent in school choice policies. The number of school districts has declined from over 
130,000 in 1930 to about 16,000 in 1970 (Berry, 2005). Currently, there are about 15,000 school 
districts (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Howell, 2005). Number of public schools has also declined 
during the 20th Century. From a total of 217,000 in 1920, the number of schools in the US currently 
is over 90,000 (Berry, 2005). The average sizes of school districts and schools have also changed. 
Between 1930 and 2000, the average daily attendance in school increased from 87 to about 480 
students. For school districts, the average daily attendance in school increased from 170 to about 
2900 students between 1930 and 2000 (Berry, 2005). The size of the school boards also declined 
as a result of the movement toward a centralized system of schooling in the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Howell, 2005).  
The consolidation of school districts is a consequence of larger historical developments in 
the economic and political structure (Howell, 2005). The progressive era embarked on removing 
politics and inefficiencies on account of corruption and patronage from local and state 
governments. Howell notes that “Businessmen, professors, and politicians lobbied for the 
transformation of an agrarian, decentralized pattern of schooling into a bona fide public school 
system that promoted the values of centralization, efficiency, modernization, and hierarchical 
control.” (Howell, 2005, p. 3) The concerns with objectivity and efficiency gave rise to rational 
control and professionalism (Howell, 2005; Chubb and Moe, 1990). The civil service was invented 
to reward merit and modernity in government sector. These changes mirror the ongoing changes 
in private economic sectors. Increasing involvement of the state governments in public education 
finance and policy influenced school district consolidation (Strang, 1987). This view on 
consolidation, however, is a supply side argument, i.e., the progressive leaders supplied those 
reforms (Fischel, 2009). In terms of demand side perspective, the local residents gave up control 
over one-room schools in most cases and opted for consolidated, age-graded schools “because the 
one-room school did not prepare their children for a high school education. Farmers and other rural 
property owners were penalized if their schools were not “making the grade” and educating 
resident children in a more systematic way.” (Fischel, 2009, p. 2) The penalty was in the form of 
lowered property values. 
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Effectiveness of Inter-School District Competition  
 
The literature on school choice includes studies on a range of choice and competition options 
including homeschooling, private schools, magnet schools, vouchers, charters and existence of 
multiple school districts in a Metropolitan Area (MA). School choice can take both intra-district 
and inter-district dimensions. For example, alternative forms of schools including charter schools, 
magnet schools, vouchers and private schools create competitive market conditions for traditional 
public schools within a school district. 
While there are several studies on school choice, such as private schools, charter schools 
and vouchers, researchers have not adequately studied school choice that is operationalized as 
inter-school district competition (Belfield and Levin, 2005; Gill and Booker, 2015). The existence 
of more school districts within a Metropolitan Area (MA) is the inter-district dimension of school 
choice as these school districts compete for students. The few studies on the role of inter-school 
district competition in effectiveness of public education focus on propositions of a single 
theoretical tradition in public choice that was pioneered by Tiebout (1956) and further developed 
by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) (Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 1997 & 2000; Zanzig, 1997). The 
proponents of this market-type competition argue that having more school districts to compete for 
students in a Metropolitan Area (MA) produces greater productive efficiency in student learning 
outcomes – the one element of effectiveness. Estimating productive efficiency as a positive 
relationship between measures of inter-school district competition and student achievements, 
Hoxby (2000) confirmed that such a relationship indeed exists. Consequently, her study’s policy 
recommendation is to maintain polycentric school district governments in an urban area rather than 
a consolidated regional school district government. However, Rothstein (2007) critically evaluated 
Hoxby’s (2000) study and reported that there was no relationship between inter-school district 
competition and student achievement. These conflicting findings make it necessary to investigate 
this topic through a more nuanced approach. This study attempts such an approach. 
 
 
The Role of Local Political Institutions 
 
Proponents of inter-school district competition also argue that a polycentric form of government 
works against the natural tendency of local governments to work with plentiful resources (Craw, 
2008; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010). Because of the competitive 
pressures the local political institutions realize productive efficiencies by providing optimum 
levels of goods and services at lower levels of resources (Craw, 2008; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 
2003). As local residents’ political representatives, political institutions match citizen demand with 
school district resources (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). A limited number of studies have examined 
the role of local political institutions on local government spending, though not particularly in the 
context of school districts (Berry and Gersen, 2009; Craw, 2008; MacDonald, 2008). These studies 
used the reformism hypothesis to argue that type of local government matters in controlling 
resource use and inefficiencies in providing public goods and services (Craw, 2008; Frant, 1996; 
Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 2003). The key argument in the reformism model is that if elected officials 
of a local government exercise less direct control over budgets then that local government would 
use lower levels of resources in providing same set of public goods and services in comparison to 
a local government where local elected officials have more direct control over use of resources. 
This direct control over resources permits elected officials to cater to narrow constituency 
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demands. Under the scenario of limited direct control over resources, elected officials adopt 
residents’ preferred level of demand for public education. The reformists argue that council-
manager form of local government and at-large council elections are better than the mayor-council 
government and ward-based council elections in this regard. 
 
 
Joint Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Local Political Institutions: A 
Theoretical Justification 
 
Craw’s (2008) Tamed Leviathan Model is particularly useful theory in examining joint effects of 
school choice and local political institutions on student learning as his theory has integrated 
elements of the reformism theory and public choice theory. The reformism theory argues that some 
type of local governments that exercise direct control over local government operations are not 
good for productive efficiency and equity than those exercising indirect control. The other key 
element of Craw’s Tamed Leviathan Model is that existence of polycentric form of governments 
in urban regions is preferable to urban regional consolidated governments in realizing equity and 
efficiency in various desirable outcomes. The Tamed Leviathan Model posits that some type of 
local governments that exercise direct control over polycentric local governments’ operations are 
not good for productive efficiency and equity than those exercising indirect control.  Craw (2008) 
empirically tested and affirmed his Tamed Leviathan Model in the context of municipal 
governments in the USA. This study adapts the Tamed Leviathan Model in the context of school 
districts in the USA and contrasts this model with the interplay between reformism theory and 
consolidated local government theory. Following Berkman and Plutzer (2005), Berry and Gersen 
(2009), and Craw (2008), this study defines local political institutions as electoral structures of 
school districts’ governing boards and superintendents’ offices. Additionally, school districts’ 
autonomy in raising revenue through the imposition of property taxes is subsumed under the 
concept of political institutions. 
A limited number of studies have examined the role of local political institutions on local 
government spending, though not particularly in the context of school districts (Berry and Gersen, 
2009; Craw, 2008; MacDonald, 2008). However, researchers have not considered the effects of 
inter-school district competition and local political institutions together on student achievement 
and have ignored equity. This lack of cross fertilization in the literature warrants a fresh 
investigation of the role of political institutions and inter-school district competition on equity and 
productive efficiency in student learning and achievement gaps. Furthermore, the empirical 
literature in the context of both public-school finance and general local governments report 
opposing findings (see Andrews et al., 2002; Belfield and Levin, 2005; Craw, 2008; Gordon and 
Knight, 2008; Hoxby, 2000; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010; Rothstein, 
2007). This warrants investigation and integration of additional and consistent theoretical 
propositions for further empirical study. 
In this study’s context, productive efficiency in particular is defined in terms of the level 
of outcome at the lowest possible input (Rice and Schwartz, 2015), where the inputs are inter-
school district competition and political institutions. The outcome is student achievement. A 
second approach to measuring educational effectiveness is through equity. Following Harris et. al. 
(2001) this study defines equity in terms of regional equity/inequity in student achievement. This 
study answers equity issues by assessing whether and how student achievement varies based on 
within state ranking of median household income in the district. Therefore, consistent with Harris 
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et al. (2001) and Hoxby (1996), in this study equity is defined as the distribution of student 
achievement in school districts with varying income levels within a state. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Consistent with the Tamed Leviathan Model and consolidated theory of local government, I 
investigate questions pertaining to productive efficiency and equity in urban school districts in the 
USA. Broadly, this study’s research questions include why and how inter-school district 
competition and local political institutions jointly matter in policy-relevant goals that include 
productive efficiency and equity. As discussed in the preceding, the Tamed Leviathan Model and 
consolidated theory of local government provide the appropriate theoretical framework to 
investigate these research questions. Several hypotheses help answer these research questions 
more appropriately. These hypotheses take opposite turns when one evaluates and contrasts the 
Tamed Leviathan Model and the theory of consolidated government in the context of empirical 
investigation in this study. This study’s hypotheses according to the Tamed Leviathan Model 
include the following. Regarding efficiency, with an increase in inter-school district competition 
student achievement increases but political institutions moderate this relationship. In particular, a) 
student achievement in fiscally dependent school districts is higher in comparison to fiscally 
independent school districts; b) student achievement in school districts with appointed 
superintendents is higher in comparison to those with elected superintendents; c) student 
achievement in school districts with appointed boards is higher in comparison to school districts 
with at large boards; d) student achievement in school districts with at large boards is higher in 
comparison to school districts with ward-based elected boards; e) student achievement in school 
districts with appointed boards is higher in comparison to those with ward-based elected boards; 
f) student achievement in school districts with appointed boards is higher in comparison to those 
with mixed boards; g) student achievement in school districts with at large boards is higher in 
comparison to those with mixed boards; h) student achievement in school districts with mixed 
boards is higher in comparison to those with ward-based elected boards as the level of inter-school 
district competition increases. For estimating equity implications of inter-school district 
competition and political institutions, two hypotheses are proposed. First, the positive effect of 
inter-school district competition on student achievement will be more positive for low income 
school districts than high income school districts. Second, the relative positive effects of types of 
political institutions on student achievement will be more positive for low income school districts 
than high income school districts. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
This study uses National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88) survey of the National 
Center of Education Statistics (NCES). The NELS:88 is a large nationally representative sample 
of students containing data on student achievement, student, family and school characteristics. The 
dataset for the base year, first follow up year and second follow up year (1988-92) has 27,390 
cases for a sample of 1030 schools. These observations include information on drop-out and no 
response in subsequent follow-ups. The panel for the base year (8th grade), first follow- up (10th 
grade) and the third follow-up (12th grade) comprise 16,490 students. The merging of NELS:88 
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with school district level datasets does not lead to significant number of missing observations on 
school districts regarding various measures of dependent variables (Hoxby, 2000). The final 
analytical sample of students in the urban school districts (i.e., those school districts that are in 
Metropolitan Areas) is about 9,000.  
I follow other similar studies to measure inter-school district competition (Hoxby, 2000; 
Rothstein, 2007). The school district and higher level data for years 1990 and 1992 were merged 
with data on student achievement and other relevant variables of the first three waves of the NELS. 
The school district Local Education Agency IDs (LEA) for the NELS data were derived using 
programs utilized to compile analytical sample in Rothstein (2007). Jesse Rothstein has generously 
made available his STATA programs that he used in his 2007 paper at: 
http://gsppi.berkeley.edu/faculty/jrothstein/hoxby/documentation-for-hoxby-comment. However, 
in merging the school district level data with the NELS data LEA IDs were used instead of the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) codes that were used by Rothstein (2007). I followed this 
approach because the Unified Fiscal Non-Fiscal Data (UFNFD) from NCES provided more 
accurate measures of inter-school district competition. Also, the correspondence between the MSA 
codes and the LEA codes is more robust in the UFNFD data than the data in School District Data 
Book 1990 that were used by Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (2007). Selection of urban school 
districts generate a panel of 5,017 K-12 pseudo-unified districts for years 1990 and 1992. Based 
on the Common Core of Data, these urban pseudo-unified districts enrolled 74.1% of nation's 
public-school students in 1990 which rose to 77.5% in 1995. Since the UFNFD data does not 
include information on local revenues from property tax sources, the relevant information on the 
variable came from School District Finance Survey for each of the sample years.  
Measures for local political institutions have been derived from the Popularly Elected 
Officials Surveys for years 1987 and 1992 by the Census of Governments of the US Census 
Bureau. This survey has since been discontinued and therefore similar analysis on a national scale 
for more recent time is difficult. Due to this data limitation, the study period is confined to fiscal 
years between 1990 and 1992.  
The Census data on School District Demographics System of the NCES are utilized for 
demographic and economic variables including school district population, poverty, median 
household income, homeownership, and median housing value. The Census data for years 1990 
and 2000 have been linearly interpolated to derive data for the year 1992 (Millimet and Collier, 
2008; Millimet and Rangaprasad, 2007). Following Hirsch and Schumacher (2004), the data on 
unionization of public sector employees in states was compiled from Hirsch and Macpherson 
(2003) as a proxy for teachers' unionization. The data on court rulings against state funding system 
came from Corcoran and Evans (2008).  
 Following production function studies (Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 2000; Roscigno et al., 
2006; Zanzig, 1997), the public education productivity is measured in terms of joint effects of 
inter-school district competition and local political institutions on student achievement. The 
dependent variables for the study include standardized math and reading scores of 10th-grade 
students in 1990 and 12th-grade students in 1992. These student achievement measures for two 
years have been selected to match with the corresponding measures of inter-school district 
competition and political institutions for those years. 
The measures for inter-school district competition and political institutions are based on 
Hoxby (2000), Rothstein (2007), and Craw (2008). Political institutions are measured in three 
ways following Berkman and Plutzer (2005) and Craw (2008). The first measure indicates whether 
a school district is fiscally dependent on other local governments. The second political institution 
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measure indicates whether a school district has an elected superintendent. The third variable 
measures whether the school district's governing board is comprised of all appointed members, all 
elected at-large members, all ward-based elected members or some members elected at large while 
others ward-based elected.  
Inter-school district competition has two measures. The first measure is one minus the 
Herfindahl Index of student enrollment shares of school districts and is bounded between 0 - 1. 
Herfindahl Index is simply the summation of squares of student enrollment in each school district 
as a proportion of total number of students in a Metropolitan Area. This index captures the concept 
of inter-school district competition by calculating a common value of competition for students in 
the urban regional market. A value of Herfindahl index closer to zero implies existence of high 
levels of competition in a Metropolitan Area. The second measure is the number of school districts 
per 1000 students in a Metropolitan Area (MA). A higher value on these MA level measures 
indicates a higher level of inter-school district competition. The 10-year lagged instruments for 
inter-school district competition are measured similarly. 
Consistent with Harris et al. (2001) equity is defined as the distribution of student 
achievements across school districts based on within state groupings of school districts' median 
household incomes. Equity is operationalized in terms of regional equity/inequity in student 
learning, assessing whether student standardized test scores vary based on within state groupings 
of school districts' median household incomes. School districts are grouped into quintiles 
according to within state median household income rankings in this regard. 
Additionally, various student/family and school characteristics consistent with Goldhaber 
and Brewer (2000), Hoxby (2000), and Rothstein (2007) are also included as control variables. 
These variables include student's 8th grade scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES and at 
the school level, the variables include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of minority 
students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and 
whether the school is private or public. Three state level control variables that capture differences 
in state policies include measures on teacher unionization, court rulings, and regions. 
Given the panel and hierarchical nature of the data, two modeling strategies are followed. 
For applying the panel data model in a situation in which some of the variables are time-invariant 
and the competition measures are potentially correlated with the time- invariant unit-level errors, 
Hausman-Taylor regression model is utilized (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). This modeling 
approach thus handles a limited form of endogeneity. Additionally, the contemporary Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (multi-level modeling) approach has been employed in estimating this study’s 
hypotheses. However, it must be noted that the multi-level linear modeling approach assumes away 
any correlation between independent variables and error terms including the unit level time-
invariant heterogeneity. The nature of NELS:88-92 is such that sample students cluster within 
schools. Sample schools may cluster within school districts which in turn may cluster within MAs 
and states. However, given that the NELS has 1030 schools in its sample, it is unlikely to find 
more than five schools within a school district. This is well below the threshold level of 5 
observations per school district for HLM to be efficient (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 247; 
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Renzulli, Macpherson, and Beattie, 2011). Since inter-school district 
measure is at the MSA level, it is also likely that schools may cluster at that level. However, given 
that there are more than 300 MSAs in the US, it is unlikely that the NELS:88 sample will have, on 
an average, more than 5 schools in each MSA. Similarly, given that there are about 200 MSAs in 
the final analytical sample, the clustering of MSAs at the state level also does not meet the 
threshold criteria. Therefore, the final analytic sample has a two-level data structure. Indeed, the 
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model diagnostic tests (the Likelihood Ratio test, the AIC and the BIC – not shown here) show 
that three level models do not fit the data any better than two level models. The student/family 
characteristics are measured at the individual level. School, district and MSA level variables 
coincide with the MSA level measures.  
 Clustering of cases around higher level of units produces inefficient coefficients because 
errors are correlated and there may be group-specific error variances (DiPrete and Forristal, 1994; 
Kaufman, 1995; Roscigno et al., 2006). The multi-level regression model addresses the error in 
estimation and produces accurate standard errors for making inferences. The empirical studies on 
the relationship between inter-school district competition and educational outcomes have not used 
multi-level modeling technique. Additionally, post-estimation marginal analyses (not included 
here) of the results from the linear multi-level regressions for interactive models are performed to 
test hypotheses.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics and the results for the Hausman-Taylor and multi-level linear models are 
presented in Appendix A at the end of this paper. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for the 
variables included in various regression models. Tables A2, A3, and A4 present the main results 
for models that include types of electoral composition of school district boards as measures of 
local political institutions. The set of tables A5, A6, and A7 and the other set of tables A8, A9, and 
A10 present similar results for models including districts with an elected or appointed 
superintendent and fiscal dependence as measures of local political institutions respectively. These 
tables present results for only key independent variables and their interaction terms along with 
aggregate model-specific statistics. Only statistically significant interactions are included in the 
tables. Also, standard errors are included for statistically significant coefficients only. All the 
models in the tables include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion 
of school age population (5-17 years), Percent of >25 years population with at least high school 
diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white population, Racial Diversity 
Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing 
units, Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue 
from property taxes, Log of per pupil revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, 
Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining agreements, Percent of 
non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th 
grade scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include 
student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch 
students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is private or public. For 
the multi-level linear models with significant interactions, several additional marginal analyses 
(not shown here) aid their substantive interpretations. The Hausman-Taylor regression results for 
the three types of political institutions are presented in tables A2, A5 and A8. 
The multi-level linear regression results for student's math and reading scores in the 10th 
grade for the three types of political institutions are presented in tables A3, A6, and A9. Finally, 
the multi-level linear regression results for student's math and reading scores in the 12th grade for 
the three types of political institutions are presented in tables A4, A7, and A10. The regression 
models are weighted by the number of students in school districts. One of the key methodological 
difference between the Hausman-Taylor model and the linear multilevel model is that whereas the 
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former models a limited form of endogeneity the latter assumes away any correlation between 
independent variables and the error term. 
Marginal analyses of interactions in multi-level linear regression models (not shown here) 
is done to separate marginal effects of the interacting variables from each other (Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder, 2006; Craw, 2008; Dawson and Richter, 2006). This separation also facilitates testing 
of various interactive hypotheses: whether differences in marginal effects and marginal predictions 
reported at different combinations of specific values of the moderating variables are different from 
zero. Bonferroni adjusted standard errors are applied in this regard (Dawson and Richter, 2006). 
 
 
Hausman-Taylor Regression Model Results 
 
The sigma_u in the tables for the Hausman-Taylor regression models (tables A2, A5, and A8) is 
the standard deviation of the individual student effect and sigma_e is the standard deviation of the 
idiosyncratic error. Similarly, the rho in tables A2, A5, and A8 is intraclass correlation of the error. 
A value close to 1 implies that the variance in random effects (the individual student effect - 
sigma_u squared) is very large relative to the variance of the idiosyncratic error (sigma_e squared). 
This happens to be the case in the Hausman-Taylor regression models because the rho varies 
between 0.77 to 0.92. 
Tables A2, A5, and A8 show that when inter-school district competition is correlated with 
the individual level effects, the inter-school district competition interacts with the within-state 
median housing income quintile rankings of school districts in affecting student's reading and math 
scores. Only one measure of political institutions has a negative and significant effect on student's 
reading score. In table 8, student's reading scores are significantly lower in fiscally dependent 
school districts than those in fiscally independent school districts. 
 
 
Multilevel Linear Regression Models 
 
Multilevel model results for student's 10th grade reading and math scores are presented in tables 
A3, A6, and A9. Results show that the two measures of inter-school district competition interact 
with the type of school district's fiscal autonomy in affecting student's 10th grade reading scores. 
With an increase in inter-school district competition, student's reading scores are higher in fiscally 
dependent school districts than those in independent school districts. 
The student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition 
interacts with the within- state median household income rankings of school district in affecting 
student's 10th grade reading scores. Specifically, results in models using the type of school district 
board and the type of fiscal autonomy of school district show that students in the third income 
quintile school district have higher reading scores than those in the lowest income quintile school 
districts as the inter-school district competition increases. Additionally, results in models using the 
type of school district superintendent show that students in the second and the third income quintile 
school districts have higher reading scores than those in the lowest income quintile school districts 
as inter-school district competition increases. 
Political institutions also interact with the within-state median household income rankings 
of school districts in affecting student's 10th grade reading and math achievement with a few 
exceptions. Student's 10th grade reading score is lower in the third income quintile mixed board 
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school district than those in lowest income quintile appointed board school district in the model 
that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition. Student's 
10th grade reading and math score is higher in the second, the third and the fourth income quintile 
school districts with elected superintendent than those in the lowest income quintile school district 
with appointed superintendent. Student's 10th grade reading and math score is lower in the second, 
the third and the fourth income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest 
income quintile independent school districts in the models that use the Herfindahl Index measure 
of inter-school district competition. Student's 10th grade math score is lower in the fourth and the 
top income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest income quintile 
independent school districts in models that use student enrollment weighted count measure of 
inter-school district competition. 
Multilevel model results for student's 12th grade reading and math scores are presented in 
tables A4, A7, and A10. Results show that the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district 
competition interacts with the type of school district board in affecting student's 12th grade math 
scores. With an increase in inter-school district competition, student's math scores are higher in at-
large, ward-based, and mixed board school districts than those in appointed board school districts. 
The student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition 
interacts with the within-state median household income rankings of school district in affecting 
student's 12th grade reading scores in the model that uses the type of school district board as 
political institution. Specifically, results in models using the type of school district board show that 
students in the fourth income quintile school districts have higher reading scores than those in the 
lowest income quintile school districts. 
The political institutions also interact with the within-state median household income 
rankings of school districts in affecting student's 12th grade reading and math achievement with a 
few exceptions. The type of school district board interacts with the within-state median household 
income rankings of school districts in affecting student 12th grade reading and math achievement. 
Specifically, student's 12th grade reading scores are lower in the second and the third income 
quintile school districts with ward-based boards than those in the lowest income quintile school 
district with appointed boards. Student's 12th grade math scores are higher in the fourth income 
quintile school districts with mixed boards than those in the lowest income quintile school district 
with appointed boards. The type of school district superintendent and the type of fiscal autonomy 
of school districts interact with the within-state median household income rankings of school 
districts in affecting student’s 12th grade math achievement. Student's 12th grade math scores are 
lower in the fourth and the top income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the 
lowest quintile independent school districts. Student's 12th grade math scores are higher in the 
third and the fourth income quintile school districts with elected superintendents than those in the 
lowest income quintile school districts with appointed superintendents. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study’s results are consistent with similar empirical studies. Using instrumental variable 
regression model on cross-section data, Rothstein (2007) report that inter-school district 
competition has no effect on student achievement. On the other hand, the study by Hoxby (2000) 
found positive effect of inter-school district competition on student achievement. Substantively, 
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these results suggest that inter-school district competition does not robustly affect student 
achievement. 
The additive models offer mixed results regarding the effects of political institutions on 
student achievement. Out of various types of political institutions, only the type of school district 
superintendent and the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts have significant effects on 
student achievement in some models. Student's 10th grade math scores are higher in school 
districts with an elected superintendent than those with appointed superintendents. Student's 
reading scores are lower in fiscally dependent school districts than in fiscally independent school 
districts. 
 Results in respect of the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts and the type of school 
district superintendents are counter to the reformism hypothesis (Craw, 2008) because 
accountability to parent local government body due to fiscal dependence and employer-employee 
dynamics does not translate in productivity gains in student achievement. These results do not 
support the theory of consolidated government either. Overall, the additive models imply that 
school districts with appointed superintendents and those that are fiscally dependent are 
productively less efficient. 
 
 
Productive Efficiency Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Political 
Institutions 
 
The interactive models offer mixed results on the joint effects of inter-school district competition 
and local political institutions on student achievement. The marginal analyses (not shown here) go 
deeper into the details of productive efficiency effects of inter-school district competition and 
political institutions. In the multilevel models, inter-school district competition and type of 
political institutions interact in influencing student achievement (Model M2 in Table A4 and 
Models R3 and R6 in Table A9). With an increase in the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school 
district competition, student's 12th grade math scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed 
board school districts than those in appointed board school districts. This finding does not support 
the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) because with an increase in competition more 
professional political institutions such as the appointed school district board did not turn out to be 
productively more efficient. With an increase in inter-school district competition, student's reading 
scores are higher in fiscally dependent school districts than those in independent school districts. 
This finding implies that the fiscally dependent school districts are productively more efficient 
than their independent counterparts. This finding supports the theory of consolidated government. 
Results in Models R3 and R6 in Table A9 show some support for the Tamed Leviathan 
Model in Craw (2008). The results from marginal analysis (not shown here) of interaction in Table 
A9 support the productive efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan model because increase in 
competition widens the gap in student's 10th grade reading scores between those in fiscally 
dependent school districts and those in fiscally independent school districts. Similar relationship 
is observed when the inter-school district competition is measured as student weighted count of 
school districts in a MA. 
With an increase in the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition, 
student's 12th grade math scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed board school 
districts than those in appointed board school districts. This finding does not support the Tamed 
Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) because with an increase in competition more professional 
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political institutions such as the appointed school district board did not turn out to be productively 
more efficient. With an increase in inter-school district competition student's 10th grade reading 
scores however, are higher in fiscally dependent school districts than those in fiscally independent 
school districts in models that use either type of inter-school district competition. This finding 
implies that productive efficiency of inter-school district competition is higher in fiscally 
dependent school districts than in independent school districts. This finding supports the Tamed 
Leviathan model in Craw (2008).  
 
 
Equity Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Political Institutions 
 
The marginal analyses (not shown here) go deeper into the details of equity effects of inter-school 
district competition and political institutions. The results in the Hausman-Taylor regression models 
(Tables A2, A5, and A8) show that inter-school district competition has equity effects on student 
achievement, but local political institutions do not. Multi-level models (in tables A3, A4, A6, A7, 
A9, and A10) also provide results concerning equity. The student enrollment weighted count 
measure of inter-school district competition interacts with the within-state median household 
income rankings of school district in affecting student's 10th grade reading scores. Regarding the 
type of school district board and the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts, students in the 
third income quintile school districts have higher 10th grade reading scores than those in the lowest 
income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. Additionally, 
regarding the type of school district superintendent, students in the second and the third income 
quintile school districts have higher 10 grade reading scores than those in the lowest income 
quintile school districts as inter-school district competition increases. Results in the model using 
the type of school district board show that students in the fourth income quintile school districts 
have higher 12th grade reading scores than those in the lowest income quintile school districts as 
the student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition increases. 
These results imply that the increased inter-school district competition leads to inequity in student's 
reading scores in 10th and 12th grades therefore supporting the claims underlying the theory of 
consolidated government. 
Student's 10th grade reading score is lower in the third income quintile mixed board school 
district than those in lowest income quintile appointed board school district in the model that uses 
student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition. Student's 10th 
grade reading and math score is higher in the second, the third and the fourth income quintile 
school districts with elected superintendent than those in the lowest income quintile school district 
with appointed superintendent in models that use either measures of inter-school district 
competition. Student's 10th grade reading and math score is lower in the second, the third and the 
fourth income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest income quintile 
independent school districts in the models that use the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school 
district competition. Student's 10th grade math score is lower in the fourth and the top income 
quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest income quintile independent 
school districts in models that use student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school 
district competition. 
Student's 12th grade reading scores are lower in the second and the third income quintile 
school districts with ward-based boards than those in the lowest income quintile school district 
with appointed boards in models that use either type of inter-school district competition. Student's 
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12th grade math scores are higher in the fourth income quintile school districts with mixed boards 
than those in the lowest income quintile school district with appointed boards in models that use 
either type of inter-school district competition. Student's 12th grade math scores are lower in the 
fourth and the top income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest 
quintile independent school districts in models that use either type of inter-school district 
competition. Student's 12th grade math scores are higher in the third and the fourth income quintile 
school districts with elected superintendents than those in the lowest income quintile school 
districts with appointed superintendents in models that use either type of inter-school district 
competition. Clearly, these results imply that differences in political institutions across school 
districts lead to inequity in student's reading and math scores in 10th and 12th grades as political 
institutions with little direct control over school district’s resources do not produce equity in 
student learning. 
Marginal analysis of interactions in Table A3 show that the increased competition helps 
students in the third income quintile school districts score higher in 10th grade reading scores than 
those in the top income quintile school districts. The comparative marginals however show that 
increase in competition widens the gap in student's 10th grade reading scores between those in the 
third income quintile school districts and those in the lowest income quintile school districts. The 
comparative marginals similarly show that increase in competition widens the gap in student's 12th 
grade reading and math scores respectively between those in the fourth income quintile school 
districts and those in the second income quintile school districts for the former and between those 
in the top and the fourth income quintile school districts and those in the lowest income quintile 
school districts for the latter. These findings support the equity argument in the consolidated local 
government model. The singular comparative marginal similarly supports the equity argument in 
the consolidated local government model because there is inequity in student's 10th grade reading 
scores between those in the third income quintile school districts and those in the lowest income 
quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. The singular comparative 
marginal has similar finding because student's 12th grade reading scores are higher in the fourth 
income quintile school districts than those in the second income quintile school districts as the 
inter- school district competition increases. 
Results from marginal analyses of 10th grade reading scores in the relevant model that uses 
student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition suggest that school 
districts with at- large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those with the mixed boards, 
those with the ward-based boards in that order. The school districts with the appointed boards 
however show equal student achievements across all income quintile districts. This is evident 
because school districts with appointed boards in all income quintiles demonstrate equity in student 
achievement, whereas the school districts with at-large boards in all income quintiles show 
inequity in 10th grade reading scores. Similarly, school districts with mixed boards in the top and 
the fourth income quintiles and school districts with ward-based boards in the top income quintiles 
show inequity in 10th grade reading scores. So, appointed school district boards help with equity 
when the focus is on poorer school districts. 
Results for marginal analyses of 12th grade reading scores for interactions in the model 
that uses the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition suggest that school 
districts with at-large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those with the ward-based 
boards, those with the appointed boards and those with the mixed boards in that order. So, in 
addition to the appointed school district boards, the mixed school district boards also help with 
equity when the focus is on student outcomes in poorer school districts. Marginal analysis produces 
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similar results in case of 12th grade reading score and student enrollment weighted count measure 
of inter-school district competition, 12th grade math score and the Herfindahl Index measure of 
inter-school district competition, and 12th grade math score and student enrollment weighted count 
measure of inter-school district competition respectively. 
The school districts with appointed and mixed boards are more equitable perhaps because 
they are better able to manage cooperation with other school districts in providing public 
education. Frederickson (1999) and LeRoux, Brendenburger, and Pandey (2010) argue that that 
professional managers are more adept in brokering and maintaining cooperative service 
arrangements across local government boundaries than elected officials, who have a shorter time 
horizon and may be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. 
Additionally, there is partial support for the reformism perspective because student's 12th 
grade reading score is higher in the third income quintile school districts with appointed boards 
than those with mixed boards in the same quintile. However, in another case the reformism 
perspective is not supported because student's 12th grade reading score is higher in school districts 
with ward-based boards than those with at-large boards within the lowest income quintile school 
districts. Student's 12th grade math score is also higher in the fourth income quintile school 
districts with mixed and at-large boards than those with appointed boards in the same quintile. So, 
school districts with more professional political institutions aren't showing higher student 
achievement.  
Regarding equity effects of elected / appointed superintendents, marginal analysis results 
suggest that school districts with appointed superintendents are more inequitable than those with 
elected superintendents. This is evident because student's 10th grade reading scores are higher in 
most income quintile school districts with appointed superintendents in comparison to those with 
appointed superintendents in lower level income quintiles respectively. Results from marginal 
analyses for 10th grade math scores for interactions in the model that uses Herfindahl index 
measure of inter-school district competition suggest that school districts with either types of 
superintendents are equally inequitable. Results from marginal analyses for 10th grade math for 
interactions in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school 
district competition however suggest that school districts with appointed superintendents are more 
inequitable than those with elected superintendents. Similar results for 12th grade math scores 
hold. So, overall school districts with elected superintendents help with equity when the focus is 
on student outcomes in poorer school districts. 
These findings do not support the argument that professional managers are better able to 
manage cooperation with other school districts in providing public education than elected officials, 
who have a shorter time horizon and may be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. 
Additionally, marginal analysis results do not support the reformism perspective because student's 
10th grade math scores are higher in the fourth and the second income quintile school districts 
with elected superintendent than those with appointed superintendents in similar income quintiles 
respectively and because appointed superintendents are arguably more professional. 
Results from marginal analysis of equity effects of fiscally dependent / independent school 
districts for student's 10th grade reading scores and for 10th grade math scores suggest that fiscally 
independent school districts are more inequitable than fiscally independent school districts. This 
is evident because inequity exists for a greater number of comparisons across income quintiles for 
fiscally independent school districts than those for fiscally dependent school districts. Results in 
for 12th grade math scores show similar patterns. So, fiscally dependent school districts help with 
equity when the focus is on student outcomes in poorer school districts. This finding supports the 
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equity argument in the consolidated local government model. Additionally, these results do not 
support the reformism perspective because student's 10th grade math score in the fourth income 
quintile fiscally independent school districts is higher than those in the same income quintile 
fiscally dependent school districts and because fiscally dependent school districts have arguably 
more professional governing arrangement.  
Results support the equity argument in the consolidated local government model. Student's 
10th grade reading scores are lower in the top income quintile school district than those in the third 
income quintile as the competition increases in the model that uses student enrollment weighted 
count measure of inter-school district competition and the type of school district board. Student's 
10th grade reading scores are higher in the third income quintile school districts than those in the 
lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases in the 
model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition 
and the type of school district superintendent. Similar model for student's 12th grade reading scores 
shows that they are higher in the fourth income quintile school districts than those in the second 
income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. Student's 12th 
grade math scores in the top and the fourth income quintile school districts are higher than those 
in the lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases in 
the model that uses the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition and the type 
of school district superintendent. Student's 10th grade reading scores are higher in the third income 
quintile school districts than those in the lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school 
district competition increases in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure 
of inter-school district competition and the type of school district fiscal autonomy.  Similar model 
for student's 12th grade reading scores shows that they are higher in the fourth income quintile 
school districts than those in the second income quintile school districts as the inter-school district 
competition increases. These results show that with an increase in competition inequity in student 
achievement widens between students in higher income quintile school districts and those in lower 
income quintile school districts. These findings support the equity argument in the consolidated 
local government model. 
The marginal analyses of equity effects of different types of political institutions show that 
there are equity implications of different types of political institution on student's reading and math 
scores. Student's 10th grade reading scores are generally higher in comparatively higher income 
quintile school districts than those in comparatively lower income quintile school districts. These 
results suggest that school districts with at-large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those 
with the ward-based boards, those with the mixed boards and those with the appointed boards in 
that order. Similarly, fiscally independent school districts are more inequitable than fiscally 
dependent school districts. And school districts with elected superintendents are less inequitable 
than school districts with appointed superintendents. Overall, these findings support the argument 
that professional managers are better able to manage cooperation with other school districts in 
providing public education than elected officials, who have a shorter time horizon and may be 
averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. Within income quintile group comparison 
shows that the reformism model is not supported. These findings collectively suggest that 
differences in types of political institutions and differences in income levels of school districts 
matter in equitable distribution of student achievements across school districts in the US. 
In sum, the findings robustly support the equity effects of the type of local political 
institutions and inter-school district competition. The additive models, the interactive models, and 
the marginal analyses support the productive efficiency arguments in the Tamed Leviathan Model, 
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the equity argument under the consolidated local government model but reject the reformism 
hypothesis to some extent. Results from Hausman-Taylor regression refute consolidated local 
governments models because increased inter-school district competition does lead to equitable 
educational outcomes. However, results from multilevel linear regression model show that 
competition leads to inequity in student achievement and therefore the consolidated local 
government model is supported. There is mixed support for the Tamed Leviathan Model. Findings 
support productive efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan Model in one case but negates in 
another. So, there is some support for the productive efficiency effects of competition. Overall, the 
findings support the equity effects of the type of local political institutions with few exceptions. 
School districts with relatively more professional political institutions are also relatively less 
inequitable. 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This study informs questions concerning the policy implications of equity and productive 
efficiency in educational outcomes in K-12 public education in the USA. It focuses on the role of 
school district-level locational factors including inter-school district competition and the type of 
political institutions in student achievement.  
There is limited research on the role of school choice, defined as inter-school district 
competition, on productive efficiencies and equity in educational outcomes. The broader view in 
the literature on school choice is that market-like competition for students among public schools 
bring productive efficiency in resource use and better educational outcomes (Belfield and Levin, 
2005; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Gill and Booker, 2015; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). Critics of 
school choice find such policies inequitable and inefficient. The few studies on the effects of inter-
school district competition on both student achievement and school district spending offer 
inconclusive empirical evidence (Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). Therefore, an empirical 
investigation of the role of school choice defined as inter-school district competition is important 
and has policy relevance. 
Similarly, an investigation of the role of political institutions in student learning is 
important because existing studies ignore the role of political institutions in equity and productive 
efficiency of educational outcomes. Political institutions are important to consider while 
investigating equity and productive efficiency in student learning because the local political 
institutions influence efficiencies in resource mobilization and use (Craw, 2008; Feiock, Jeong, 
and Kim, 2003). As local residents’ political representatives, political institutions also match 
citizen demand with school district’s provision for public education (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). 
This study utilizes the Tamed Leviathan model and the theory of consolidated government 
to evaluate the joint effects of political institutions and inter-school district competition on student 
achievement. This investigation makes empirical contributions to the literatures on productive 
efficiency of school choice in general and school choice as inter-school district competition in 
particular. School choice in terms of home schooling, private schools, and residential choice has 
always existed. Some scholars favor residential choice, while others find it inequitable and 
inefficient in public education. There is no conclusive evidence on positive impact of school choice 
reform policies on educational outcomes. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that these policies 
have led to re-segregation. Also, the theoretical and empirical literatures have not conclusively 
established the supremacy of school choice policies over the traditional public education system. 
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This study looks at this debate afresh in the context of inter-school district competition. 
Specifically, the empirical estimation evaluates the joint effects of political institutions and inter-
school district competition on productive efficiency and equity in student achievement. 
This study offers several interesting findings. In regard to the equity and productive 
efficiency effects of inter-school district competition and local political institutions on student 
achievement the interactive models offer mixed results. The results from Hausman Taylor 
regression model show that while the inter- school district competition has equity effects on 
student achievement the local political institutions do not. In the multilevel models however, inter-
school district competition and type of political institutions interact in influencing student 
achievement. The interactive multilevel linear regression models show that inter-school district 
competition has productive efficiency and equity effects on student achievement. The political 
institutions only affect the equity in distribution of student achievement across school districts in 
various income quintiles. 
The multilevel linear interactive regression models find evidence that the inter- school 
district competition has differential productive efficiency effects on student achievement in school 
districts with different political institutions. However, the results confirm the hypotheses in the 
Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) in one case and negate those hypotheses in others. With 
an increase in inter-school district competition, student's 10th grade reading scores are higher in 
fiscally dependent school districts than those in independent school districts. This finding implies 
that the fiscally dependent school districts are productively more efficient than their independent 
counterparts. This finding supports the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008). With an increase 
in the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition, student's 12th grade math 
scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed board school districts than those in appointed 
board school districts. This finding does not support the reformism hypothesis in Craw (2008). 
The multilevel linear interactive regression models also suggest that the inter- school 
district competition and political institutions have differential equity effects on student 
achievement. Regarding the former, results imply that the increased inter-school district 
competition leads to inequity in student's 10th grade reading scores and 12th grade reading and 
math scores. Regarding the latter, results imply that differences in political institutions across 
school districts lead to inequity in student's 10th and 12th grade reading and math scores. Student's 
reading and math scores are generally higher in comparatively higher income quintile school 
districts than those in comparatively lower income quintile school districts. 
Overall, the findings robustly support the equity effects of the type of local political 
institutions and inter-school district competition on student achievement. The additive models, the 
interactive models, and the marginal analyses support the productive efficiency arguments in the 
Tamed Leviathan Model, the equity argument under the consolidated local government model but 
reject the reformism hypothesis to some extent. Results from Hausman-Taylor regression refute 
consolidated local governments models because increased inter-school district competition does 
lead to equitable educational outcomes. However, results from multilevel linear regression model 
show that competition leads to inequity in student achievement and therefore the consolidated local 
government model is supported. There is mixed support for the Tamed Leviathan Model. Findings 
support productive efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan Model in one case but negates in 
another. So, there is some support for the productive efficiency effects of competition on student 
achievement. However, there is no support for the productive efficiency effects of political 
institutions on student achievement. Overall, the findings support the equity effects of the type of 
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local political institutions on student achievement with few exceptions. School districts with 
relatively more professional political institutions are also relatively less inequitable. 
An adequate understanding of the global, regional, and local contexts such as the roles of 
the levels of inter-school district competition and types of local political institutions in equity and 
productive efficiency in educational outcomes helps policymakers adapt policies to those contexts. 
The empirical findings of this study clarify why and how organizational, socioeconomic, and 
political contexts matter in bringing desirable educational outcomes. The policymakers can bring 
commensurate changes in the organizational and political set-up of school districts for achieving 
the goal of more equitable and effective public education. From public policy perspective, findings 
of this study therefore inform the formulation of appropriate policies for better educational 
outcomes through reorganization of school finance. 
Regarding the equity and productive efficiency in educational outcomes, the findings are 
more nuanced. While the Hausman-Taylor regression model that addresses endogeneity in a 
limited way finds no support for the productive efficiency effects of inter-school district 
competition and political institutions and equity effects of political institutions, it does find that 
increased inter-school district competition leads to inequity in educational outcomes. Based on 
these results, this study would suggest policymakers to formulate policies that lift student 
achievements in lower income school districts without any negative impact on student 
achievements in higher income school districts in metropolitan areas where inter-school district 
competition is high. One such policy may include some reorganization in school finance: for 
example, consolidating a low-income school district with an adjacent high-income school district. 
This policy would abate the level of overall inequity in educational outcomes in metropolitan areas 
by lowering the level of inter-school district competition and hence its negative effects on equity 
in student achievements. 
Except for the productive efficiency effects of the types of local political institutions, 
results from the multilevel linear regression models support the productive efficiency effect of 
inter-school district competition and equity effects of political institutions and inter-school district 
competition on educational outcomes. The findings in regard to the inter-school district 
competition pose a dilemma for policymakers. On one hand having higher levels of inter-school 
district competition in metropolitan areas encourages overall growth in student achievements, but 
the gaps in student achievements between the lower and the higher income school districts also 
register spike. However, the policymakers can mitigate this tradeoff to some extent by appointing 
more professional political institutions as such political institutions reduce inequality in student 
achievements across school districts with different income levels. 
There are however a few data and methodological limitations of this study. The Census 
Bureau has stopped collecting data on local political institutions in years after the year 1992 when 
such data were collected last. Given that data on political institutions are crucial for understanding 
the holistic effectiveness of school choice policy, this study recommends that the Census Bureau 
should reconsider collection of data on Popularly Elected Officials Survey. Additionally, the 
results from the random effects models for the fiscally dependent districts are indicative because 
the fixed effects models are more appropriate. However, the latter did not identify the coefficient 
for the fiscally dependent school districts, so the random effects model was used instead. 
Apart from the methodological issues, the policy suggestions from this study entail support 
from important local political constituents with varying political interests in public education 
including parents with children, old-age population, and inner-city residents. Local school district 
governments may face a situation in which the old-age population is less supportive of higher 
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spending on public education (Poterba, 1997; Harris et. al., 2001) because they may believe that 
families with school-age children receive nearly all of the benefits from spending on public 
schools. However, Harris et. al. (2001) offer a number of reasons why the elderly might support 
public education. One, the old-age population may expect to receive higher revenue for Social 
Security and Medicare from taxing higher wages of younger workers. This economic scenario 
becomes possible because higher investment in public education improves workers' skills and 
productivity that ultimately result in higher wages. Two, the elderly may simply believe in 
philanthropy when it comes to public education. Three, elderly homeowners may hold the 
expectation that higher spending on education will be capitalized into the value of their homes. 
Four, Tiebout sorting by the elderly could leave education spending unchanged because they may 
simply choose to live in districts with low education spending. Finally, the elderly may have higher 
interests in reducing crime rates and increasing economic activities. In achieving these goals, the 
elderly may support public education because public schools socialize children, giving them an 
understanding of civic duties, social norms, and regular work habits. 
As having more professional political institutions is good for student achievement, the 
elderly may support this policy option. Although the elderly may prefer more school districts 
within their metropolitan area for raising general skills and educational outcomes of younger 
generation in public schools, they might also prefer to achieve some balance in equity and 
productive efficiency as having more inter-school district competition leads to inequitable 
educational outcomes. 
Since parents with school-age children have real interest in supporting public education 
with better educational outcomes, the other important local interest group that influences local 
educational policy comprises inner-city residents. Unlike the elderly, the inner-city residents do 
not possess the wherewithal to exercise the Tiebout residential choice. In fact, they bear the brunt 
of several bad policy consequences of Tiebout competition. However, similar to the elderly it is in 
economic interests of inner-city residents to support policy options for equitable public education 
outcomes. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
TABLE A1 
Descriptive Statistics by Year - Student Achievement 
  1990 1992 
Variable M SD M SD 
Reading Score 49.393 10.123 50.419 10.253 
Math Score 49.383 10.673 50.372 10.511 
8th Gr. Reading Score 50.464 10.203 51.136 10.078 
8th Gr. Math Score 50.746 10.583 51.259 10.78 
White 0.366 0.482 0.379 0.485 
Black 0.317 0.465 0.312 0.463 
Hispanic 0.183 0.387 0.177 0.382 
Asian 0.117 0.321 0.112 0.315 
American Indian 0.017 0.128 0.021 0.142 
Male 0.502 0.5 1.48 0.5 
Lowest SES Qntl 0.302 0.459 0.283 0.45 
2nd SES Quintile 0.224 0.417 0.218 0.413 
3rd SES Quintile 0.212 0.409 0.216 0.411 
Top SES Quintile 0.261 0.439 0.283 0.451 
% Minority-8th 56.636 35.578 56.597 35.994 
% Free Lunch-8th 33.792 34.076 33.232 34.119 
St.-Teacher Ratio:8th 19.886 6.279 19.931 6.098 
Private School 0.227 0.419 0.258 0.437 
North East 0.36 0.48 0.324 0.468 
North Central 0.098 0.297 0.094 0.292 
South 0.245 0.43 0.256 0.436 
West 0.297 0.457 0.325 0.469 
Herfinhahl Index 0.541 0.308 0.56 0.308 
Weighted Count of SDs 0.063 0.062 0.06 0.061 
Appointed SBs 0.52 0.5 0.483 0.5 
At-Large SBs 0.334 0.472 0.364 0.481 
Ward-Based SBs 0.096 0.294 0.1 0.299 
Mixed SBs 0.05 0.219 0.053 0.225 
Elected Superintendents 0.132 0.339 0.147 0.354 
Fiscally Dependent SDs 0.418 0.493 0.387 0.487 
Lowest Quintile SDs 0.097 0.297 0.091 0.287 
2nd Qntl SDs 0.594 0.491 0.589 0.492 
3rd Income Quintile SDs 0.126 0.332 0.139 0.346 
4th Income Quintile SDs 0.107 0.309 0.109 0.311 
Top Income Quintile SDs 0.075 0.264 0.073 0.259 
    (continued) 
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  1990 1992 
Variable M SD M SD 
% Non-white in SBs 18.614 27.14 19.255 27.535 
Fiscal Capacity: % Per- Pupil  
     Revenue from Local 
Sources 
41.747 15.513 38.318 17.749 
Per-Pupil State Revenue 2994.9 882.64 3107.4 923.04 
Log-Per-Pupil St. Rev. 7.945 0.394 7.98 0.416 
Log-Total SD Population 14.402 1.603 14.399 1.519 
Total SD Population 3733810 2926200 3620380 2907050 
Total MSA Population 5843260 3453980 5831160 3508330 
Log- MSA Population 15.164 1.219 15.185 1.109 
Proportion of 5-17 Years  
     Pop. 
0.169 0.02 0.173 0.018 
% with HS or more 70.327 7.481 70.971 7.709 
% Foreign Born Pop. 24.258 13.315 25.323 13.747 
% Non-white Pop. 40.26 15.393 41.253 15.517 
Racial Diversity Index: MSA 0.498 0.136 0.515 0.14 
Median HH Income 30330.2 5577.95 32435 6165.57 
Log-Median HH Income 10.306 0.163 10.372 0.164 
% Owner Occupied Housing 43.671 14.638 44.892 14.658 
Median Housing Values 154313 66793.7 158965 65607.1 
% Local Revenue 38.847 35.982 48.218 39.001 
% Population in Poverty 17.753 6.586 17.764 6.316 
% 65 Years & above Pop. 11.611 2.673 11.413 2.61 
% Public Sector Employees  
     Under Collective  
     Bargaining  
54.461 18.306 53.519 17.109 
INTER-SCHOOL DISTRICT COMPETITION     135 
TABLE A2 
Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Type of School District Governing Board 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
2nd Lowest Qntl 0.369 0.406 5.07 -0.032 0.369 -0.833 0.002 -0.028 -0.786 -0.047 -0.074 0.73 
3rd Qntl 0.455 0.603 4.36 -0.014 0.557 -0.954 -0.072 -0.166 -0.873 -0.187 -0.346 1.32 
4th Qntl -0.156 -0.124 4.95 -0.601 -0.25 -1.41 -0.143 -0.207 0.849 -0.335 -0.415 1.31 
Top Qntl 0.12 0.193 5.14 -0.406 0.177 -0.842 -0.138 -0.271 -0.161 -0.335 -0.594 1.08 
School District 
Competition 
3.99 4.39 12.4 -0.101 17.1 12.2 0.518 -1.13 0.155 -0.524 4.1 11 
2nd Qntl*Competition   -5.69   5.46   0.932   -3.58 
3rd Qntl*Competition   -4.59   7.1   0.823   -32.951 
4th Qntl*Competition   -6.25   5.36   -1.31   -38.1066 
Top Qntl*Competition   -6.07   4.25   0   -8.78 
Intercept 3.87 -5 -11 0.527 4.49 5.46 15.3 22.6 24 5.65 7.17 3.94 
Chi-Square Statistics 12171* 9557** 9035** 12765* 11390* 11483* 19555** 15942** 14312** 29133** 27233** 27409*** 
sigma_u 7.99 9.81 10.2 7.69 8.39 8.34 7.58 8.64 9.43 5.23 5.57 5.49 
sigma_e 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Rho 0.787 0.848 0.858 0.774 0.803 0.801 0.887 0.911 0.924 0.789 0.809 0.805 
n 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Note. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A3 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading & Math Scores 
Variable Reading Scores Math Scores 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School District Competition -0.157 0.135 1.05 -0.892 -5.215 0.146 -0.834 0.187 0.331 -7.784 -5.55 
At-Large District Board  -0.316 -1.12 0.934 -0.328 -1.52 -0.186 0.192 0.022 -0.185 -0.496 -0.731 
Ward-based District Board -0.307 0.183 0.139 -0.324 0.289 -0.142 0.696 -0.467 -0.141 0.418 -0.651 
Mixed District Board -0.518 -2.07 -2.01 -0.533 -0.291 0.348 -0.379 -0.477 0.351 -0.137 -0.53 
2nd Lowest Income Quintile 0.098 -0.411 0.299 0.083 -1.15 0.168 -0.228 0.225 0.166 0.107 0.185 
3rd Income Quintile -0.006 0.051 0.229 -0.015 -0.266 0.123 0.231 0.2 0.118 0.905 0.163 
4th Income Quintile -0.417 -0.756 -0.187 -0.434 -1.64 -0.164 -1.24 -0.096 -0.167 -0.627 -0.128 
Top Income Quintile -0.508 -0.163 -0.223 -0.524 -1.67 -0.022 0.796 0.059 -0.028 0.889 0.021 
2nd Quintile*Competition  -0.176   2.31  1.02   1.82  
3rd Quintile*Competition  0.14   3.560*   1.21   2.79  
4th Quintile*Competition  -0.902   0.358  1.09   1.03  
Top Quintile*Competition  -1.95   -1.8  0.395   -0.282  
2nd Quintile*At-Large DB  0.921   0.983  -0.46   -0.391  
3rd Quintile*At-Large DB  0.313   -0.051  -1.09   -1.42  
4th Quintile*At-Large DB  1.47   1.51  0.426   0.416  
Top Quintile*At-Large DB  1.4   1.6  -1.09   -0.958  
2nd Quintile*Ward DB  -0.3   -0.323  -0.821   -0.669  
3rd Quintile*Ward DB  -1.55   -1.69  -1.59   -1.7  
4th Quintile*Ward DB  -0.441   -0.53  -0.881   -0.866  
Top Quintile*Ward DB  1.06   1.32  -1.36   -0.995  
2nd Quintile*Mixed DB  1.03   0.352  -0.197   -0.168  
3rd Quintile*Mixed DB  -1.48   -3.0562  -1.01   -1.57  
4th Quintile*Mixed DB  1.3   0.814  -0.229   0.017  
Top Quintile*Mixed DB  2.71   2.64  -1.85   -1.48  
          (continued) 
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Variable Reading Scores Math Scores 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Intercept 16.7 19.900* 
(9.650) 
20.500* 
(9.620) 
17.8 20.000* 
(9.070) 
8.88 10.7 10.5 8.32 8.15 9.34 
Log-MSA Random Effects (Std. Dev.) -0.256 -0.04891 -0.0413 -0.261 -0.052785 -0.483*** 
(0.146) 
-0.469** 
(0.146) 
-0.471** 
(0.145) 
-0.482** 
(0.147) 
-0.478** 
(0.150) 
-0.476** 
(0.148) 
Log-Residual Random Effects (Std. 
Dev.) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
Chi-Square Statistics 29797*** 36810*** 30706*** 29825*** 41164*** 33099*** 43742*** 33592*** 34540*** 45833*** 34499*** 
Loglikelihood -30707 -30690 -30703 -30707 -30687 -28575 -28566 -28574 -28575 -28563 -28574 
Note. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A4 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading & Math Scores 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
School District Competition 
-0.793 -1.669 -1.53 -1.82 -1.246 -0.531 0.25 -4.727** 
(1.573) 
1.79 -4.602 -2.89 
At-Large District Board -0.561 -1.26 -1.33 -0.549 -0.284 -0.442 -0.338 -2.36 -0.325 -0.436 -0.37 
Ward-based District Board -0.21 1.34 1.17 -0.2 1.23 1.17 -0.179 -1.02 -0.157 0.414 0.342 
Mixed District Board -0.893 -2.26 -2.5 -0.875 -0.093 -0.206 -0.038 -1.03 -0.047 -0.968 -1.02 
2nd Lowest Income Quintile 0.141 0.11 0.146 0.164 0.45 0.477 -0.171 -2.44 -0.151 0.403 0.477 
3rd Income Quintile -0.148 0.758 1.23 -0.102 1.01 1.22 -0.216 -1.46 -0.213 0.955 1.25 
4th Income Quintile 
-0.281 -1.97 -1.79 -0.251 -1.97 -1.63 -0.663 -4.170** 
(1.480) 
-0.634 -2.31 -2.19 
Top Income Quintile 0.202 -0.483 -0.514 0.241 -0.626 -0.543 -0.293 -2.53 -0.278 -0.153 -0.133 
At-Large DB*Competition 
 
0.592 0.655 
 
-2.3 -2 
 
2.680* 
(1.240) 
 
5.22 4.07 
Ward DB*Competition 
 
0.659 0.804 
 
3.41 4.04 
 
2.940* 
(1.330) 
 
7.95 7.77 
Mixed DB*Competition 
 
1.61 1.87 
 
-3.65 -3.37 
 
1.59 
 
8.12 7.59 
2nd Quintile*Competition 
 
-0.001 
  
-1.73 
  
2.780* 
(1.250) 
 
-0.239 
 
3rd Quintile*Competition 
 
0.653 
  
2.57 
  
3.200* 
(1.330) 
 
2.87 
 
4th Quintile*Competition 
 
0.269 
  
4.38 
  
2.05 
 
0.968 
 
Top Quintile*Competition 
 
0.001 
  
0.408 
  
2.910* 
(1.450) 
 
-1.12 
 
2nd Quintile*At-Large DB 
 
0.125 0.091 
 
0.242 -0.214 
 
-0.229 
 
-0.734 -0.863 
3rd Quintile*At-Large DB 
 
-1.21 -1.16 
 
-1.47 -1.15 
 
-1.36 
 
-1.77 -1.46 
4th Quintile*At-Large DB 
 
1.65 1.67 
 
1.11 1.51 
 
1.99 
 
1.55 1.64 
Top Quintile*At-Large DB 
 
0.854 0.863 
 
0.821 0.866 
 
-0.173 
 
-0.174 -0.282 
2nd Quintile*Ward DB 
 
-3.0576 -3.0284 
 
-2.85 -3.1624 
 
-0.812 
 
-1.12 -1.09 
3rd Quintile*Ward DB 
 
-3.940** 
(1.210) 
-3.890** 
(1.220) 
 
-3.910** 
(1.200) 
-3.760** 
(1.220) 
 
-2.9 
 
-3.19 -2.99 
          (continued) 
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Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
4th Quintile*Ward DB  -0.481 -0.424  -0.296 -0.186  0.066  0.085 0.212 
Top Quintile*Ward DB 
 
-0.878 -0.838 
 
-0.695 -0.796 
 
-1.37 
 
-1.02 -1.18 
2nd Quintile*Mixed DB 
 
0.975 1.04 
 
0.075 0.014 
 
-0.399 
 
-0.352 -0.304 
3rd Quintile*Mixed DB 
 
-2.33 -2.33 
 
-4.6158 -4.1613 
 
-2.23 
 
-2.02 -1.82 
4th Quintile*Mixed DB 
 
2.98 3.01 
 
2.18 2.59 
 
3.060* 
(1.410) 
 
3.120* 
(1.500) 
3.230* 
(1.460) 
Top Quintile*Mixed DB 
 
-0.036 -0.027 
 
-0.209 -0.193 
 
-0.665 
 
-0.151 -0.305 
Intercept 13.8 16.9 16.9 17.3 17.3 17.5 10 15.6 7.8 4.7 6.63 
Log-MSA Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
-0.161 -0.155 -0.161 -0.153 -0.195 -0.182 -0.254 -0.273 -0.257 -0.294 -0.262 
Log-Residual Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
Chi-Square Statistics 17597*** 23743*** 21780*** 18050*** 21526*** 20926*** 29687*** 44199*** 30432*** 43406*** 40587*** 
Loglikelihood -24211 -24200 -24201 -24211 -24194 -24198 -22482 -22465 -22481 -22464 -22467 
Note. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A5 
Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Elected/Appointed Superintendent 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Intercept 5.62 6.75 2.73 2.38 3.74 -1.67 15.2 16.6 19.9 6.06 4.26 4.25 
Chi-
Square 
Statistics 
12040*** 9151*** 8351*** 12553*** 12337*** 12460*** 20206*** 16081*** 14650*** 29032*** 29297*** 29218*** 
sigma_u 8.08 10.1 10.8 7.81 7.94 7.86 7.38 8.77 9.38 5.25 5.19 5.18 
sigma_e 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Rho 0.791 0.856 0.872 0.779 0.785 0.782 0.882 0.913 0.923 0.79 0.786 0.786 
N 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. None of the interactions in the models turned 
out to be statistically significant. 
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TABLE A6 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist Competition -0.041 0.254 0.313 -0.628 
-3.651** 
(1.285) 
0.531 -0.798 0.279 0.778 -0.429 0.629 
Elected Superintendent 0.24 -1.1 -1.19 0.17 
-3.590*** 
(0.824) 
0.877** (0.329) -1.73 -1.69 
0.784* 
(0.328) 
-1.17 -0.988 
2nd Income Quintile 0.13 0.153 0.11 0.11 -0.778 0.113 -0.945 0.046 0.095 -0.249 0.042 
3rd Income Quintile -0.006 -1.44 -0.092 -0.025 -0.73677 0.01 -0.78 0.023 -0.011 -0.402 0.004 
4th Income Quintile -0.413 -0.017 -0.508 -0.425 -1.15 -0.334 -1.89 -0.408 -0.349 -0.925 -0.439 
Top Income Quintile -0.516 0.065 -0.713 -0.518 -1.13 -0.256 -0.773 -0.318 -0.276 -0.501 -0.357 
2nd Quintile*Competition  -0.069   
3.790* 
(1.860) 
 1.24   1.21  
3rd Quintile*Competition  1.72   
5.070*** 
(1.530) 
 0.997   1.7  
4th Quintile*Competition  -0.593   2.64  1.85   2.4  
Top Quintile*Competition  -0.923   1.31  0.633   0.132  
2nd Quintile*El_Supdt  0.738 0.885  
2.620* 
(1.160) 
 2.76*** 
(0.812) 
2.60*** 
(0.714) 
 2.24** 
(0.779) 
2.02** (0.641) 
3rd Quintile*El_Supdt  
2.92** 
(0.907) 
2.47** 
(0.892) 
 3.62*** 
(0.874) 
 1.02 0.936  0.894 0.529 
4th Quintile*El_Supdt  
1.98** 
(0.690) 
2.26*** 
(0.654) 
 3.13*** 
(0.731) 
 2.37*** 
(0.590) 
2.06*** 
(0.587) 
 2.22** 
(0.677) 
1.83*** (0.551) 
Top Quintile*El_Supdt  
2.500** 
(0.936) 
3.06*** 
(0.790) 
 4.02*** 
(0.888) 
 2.020** 
(0.701) 
2.170** 
(0.685) 
 1.910* 
(0.830) 
1.81** (0.663) 
Intercept 15.9 16.6 15.9 16.4 15.6 9.2 9.26 7.6 7.56 6.22 6.48 
Log-MSA -0.263 -0.045732 -0.284 -0.273 -0.04321 
-0.502*** 
(0.150) 
-0.573*** 
(0.168) 
-0.549*** 
(0.164) 
-0.500** 
(0.154) 
-0.560** 
(0.172) 
-0.537** (0.167) 
Log-Residual Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.53*** (0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** (0.012) 
Chi-Square Statistics 29568*** 1.2E+5*** 1.3E+5*** 29852*** 1.2E+5*** 29630*** 2.3E+5*** 2.2E+5*** 30368*** 2.3E+5*** 2.2E+5*** 
Longlikelihood -30708 -30701 -30704 -30823 -30699 -28574 -28569 -28570 -28575 -28570 -28571 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
142     JHA 
TABLE A7 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist Competition -0.853 -0.97 -0.862 -1.92 -4.034 -4.05 0.498 
-2.644** 
(0.967) 
2.18 1.087 1.92 
Elected Superintendent -0.123 1.51 -0.145 -0.007 0.612 0.155 0.487 -4.4685 0.503 -1.57 -1.58 
2nd Income Quintile 0.237 0.587 0.236 0.257 0.288 0.189 -0.172 
-2.490** 
(0.858) 
-0.161 -0.066 -0.248 
3rd Income Quintile -0.075 -0.971 -0.076 -0.037 -0.957 -0.94 -0.25 -2.5452 -0.262 -0.831 -0.243 
4th Income Quintile -0.189 -0.278 -0.189 -0.174 -1.25 -1.14 -0.717 
-3.500*** 
(0.936) 
-0.701 -1.56 -0.917 
Top Income Quintile 0.272 0.153 0.272 0.295 -0.207 -0.199 -0.387 
-3.570*** 
(1.040) 
-0.385 -0.527 -0.501 
2nd 
Quintile*Competition 
 -0.445   -0.532 -0.14  
2.710* 
(1.160) 
 -1.23  
3rd 
Quintile*Competition 
 1.19   4.27 4.274  
2.870* 
(1.340) 
 2.68  
4th 
Quintile*Competition 
 0.123   5.690* 
5.361* 
(2.622) 
 3.300** 
(1.270) 
 3.56  
Top 
Quintile*Competition 
 0.176   1.85 1.95  
3.960** 
(1.430) 
 -0.707  
2nd Quintile*El_Supdt  -3.48   -2.72   
3.400** 
(1.090) 
 1.87 
2.170* 
(0.905) 
3rd Quintile*El_Supdt  -1.03   -0.312   1.12  0.645 0.149 
4th Quintile*El_Supdt  -1.16   -0.051   3.830***  3.160** 
2.710*** 
(0.918) 
Top Quintile*El_Supdt  -1.05   -0.479   
3.060** 
(1.060) 
 1.73 1.85 
Intercept 13.6 13.8 13.5 17.2 16.5 17.006 10.3 14 7.22 3.75 5.99 
          (continued) 
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Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
Log-MSA Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
-0.173 -0.179 -0.173 -0.164 -0.189 -0.166 -0.255 -0.322 -0.263 -0.395 -0.307 
Log-Residual Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
Chi-Square Statistics 17578*** 74788*** 18344*** 18087*** 71739*** 18145*** 29062*** 3.20E+05*** 28440*** 2.80E+05*** 2.90E+05*** 
Longlikelihood -24213 -24211 -24213 -24213 -24207 -24213 -22483 -22470 -22481 -22470 -22475 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A8 
Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Fiscally Dependent School District 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Dependent 
School 
Districts 
-0.45344 -2.78 -5.21 -0.45448 -2.13 -2.832 -0.046 -3.76 -5 -0.139 0.247 0.032 
Intercept -0.849 -1.53 -5.45 -4.09 6.17 -1.25 15.2 15.2 19 4.82 1.06 2.8 
Chi-
Square 
Statistics 
12107*** 10746*** 9750*** 12674*** 12630*** 12707*** 19531*** 17257*** 15527*** 29090*** 29164*** 29246*** 
sigma_u 8.05 8.94 9.65 7.75 7.77 7.72 7.59 8.33 8.97 5.23 5.21 5.17 
sigma_e 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Rho 0.789 0.822 0.843 0.776 0.777 0.775 0.887 0.905 0.917 0.789 0.788 0.786 
N 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A9 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist Competition -0.163 0.081 -0.383 -0.808 
-
3.830814 
-4.32286 0.166 -0.373 0.182 0.314 0.205 0.587 
Dependent School Districts -0.861 -0.485 -0.839 -0.846 -0.675 
-1.580** 
(0.589) 
-0.466 0.178 0.222 -0.464 0.696 0.692 
2nd Quintile 0.083 0.61 0.36 0.067 -0.252 -0.492 0.088 -0.327 0.231 0.084 0.125 0.236 
3rd Quintile -0.038 -0.485 0.21 -0.058 -0.64 -0.848 0.053 -0.485 0.173 0.046 -0.162 0.161 
4th Quintile -0.482 0.491 -0.177 -0.496 -0.663 -0.923 -0.295 -0.619 0.009 -0.301 -0.09 -0.001 
Top Quintile -0.574 0.693 -0.328 -0.58 -0.567 -0.737 -0.176 -0.104 -0.001 -0.185 0.047 -0.019 
DepSchdist*Competition  1 
1.450* 
(0.723) 
 4.940* 
(2.170) 
6.200** 
(2.170) 
 0.392 0.407  -1.11 -0.847 
2nd Quintile*Competition  -0.331   2.73 3.08  0.686   0.427  
3rd Quintile*Competition  0.909   
3.890** 
(1.510) 
4.140** 
(1.530) 
 0.819   1.43  
           (continued) 
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Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
4th Quintile*Competition  -0.877   1.95 2.4  0.771   0.23  
Top Quintile*Competition  -1.36   0.358 0.441  0.123   -0.831  
2nd Quintile*DepSchdist  -1.35 -0.87913  -1.04   -0.782 -0.854  -1 -1.04 
3rd Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.7224 -0.73931  -0.876   -0.753 -0.809  -0.767 -0.87 
4th Quintile*DepSchdist  -1.0275 -0.95192  -1.06   
-
1.830*** 
(0.444) 
-
1.900*** 
(0.459) 
 
-
1.960*** 
(0.499) 
-
1.990*** 
(0.479) 
Top Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.998 -1.08  -0.754   -1.05 -0.64749  -1.14 -0.6786 
Intercept 14.6 17.6 
18.200* 
(8.930) 
15.5 
19.000* 
(8.610) 
17.500* 
(8.410) 
8.11 11.1 10.2 7.54 8.13 9.01 
Log-MSA Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
-
0.040415 
-
0.042228 
-
0.040689 
-
0.043736 
-
0.046255 
-
0.050568 
- 
0.476*** 
(0.143) 
-
0.488*** 
(0.145) 
-
0.482*** 
(0.143) 
- 
0.475*** 
(0.144) 
-
0.490*** 
(0.147) 
-
0.483*** 
(0.144) 
Log-Residual Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.010) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.750*** 
(0.010) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
Chi-Square Statistics 29914*** 35511*** 33623*** 29979*** 34759*** 32446** 28862* 35055*** 34658*** 29465* 37581** 34670** 
Loglikelihood -30707 -30697 -30700 -30822 -30696 -30697 -28577 -28568 -28568 -28577 -28567 -28569 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b.  Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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TABLE A10 
Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist Competition -0.781 -1.213 -0.884 -1.95 -4.253 -4.332 0.275 -1.223 0.637 1.88 1.926 2.07 
Dependent School Districts -0.46 -0.431 -0.774 -0.517 -0.701 -0.953 0.274 1.84 
2.380** 
(0.893) 
0.306 
2.040** 
(0.787) 
2.090** 
(0.792) 
2nd Income Quintile 0.21 0.212 0.217 0.224 0.235 0.245 -0.154 -1.35 -0.01 -0.129 0.356 -0.014 
3rd Income Quintile -0.121 -0.893 -0.119 -0.083 -0.803 -0.891 -0.195 -2.00799 -0.037 -0.187 -0.642 -0.063 
4th Income Quintile -0.266 -0.226 -0.26 -0.252 -1.05 -1.14 -0.633 -1.17 -0.174 -0.595 -0.207 -0.163 
Top Income Quintile 0.192 -0.009 0.197 0.217 -0.165 -0.182 -0.29 -2.289 -0.128 -0.265 -0.02 -0.122 
2nd Quintile*Competition  -0.032   -0.123 -0.154  1.63   -1.87  
3rd Quintile*Competition  1.15   4.03 4.22  2.51   2.76  
4th Quintile*Competition  0.13   
5.390* 
(2.690) 
5.660* 
(2.680) 
 1.29   0.073  
            (continued) 
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Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Top Quintile*Competition  0.339   2.05 2.08  2.68   -0.934  
2nd Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.112   -0.054   -1.05 -1.15  -1.3 -1.17 
3rd Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.607   -0.34   -1.06 -1.26  -1.07 -1.31 
4th Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.932   -0.424   
-3.21*** 
(0.668) 
-3.38*** 
(0.667) 
 -3.43*** 
(0.723) 
-3.49*** 
(0.724) 
Top Quintile*DepSchdist  -0.274   -0.148   -1.15 -1.28  -1.0366 -1.01232 
Intercept 13 14.6 13.2 16.5 18 17.6 10.3 16.8 12.4 7.99 7.44 9.63 
Log-MSA Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
-0.18 -0.178 -0.182 -0.175 -0.205 -0.209 -0.247 -0.304 -0.304 -0.25 -0.06845 -0.305 
Log-Residual Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
Chi-Square Statistics 17745* 20080* 17797* 18136* 20288* 19357* 26830* 39464** 35653** 26949* 40744** 35635*** 
Loglikelihood -24212 -24210 -24212 -24212 -24206 -24207 -22483 -22466 -22468 -22482 -22464 -22468 
Note. a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05; b. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
